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This paper presents a multi-stage, multi-photon quantum key distribution protocol based on
the double-lock cryptography. It exploits the asymmetry in the detection strategies between the
legitimate users and the eavesdropper. The security analysis of the protocol is presented with
coherent states under the intercept-resend attack, the photon number splitting attack, and the
man-in-the-middle attack. It is found that the mean photon number can be much larger than
one. This complements the recent interest in multi-photon quantum communication protocols that
require a pre-shared key between the legitimate users.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 42.50.Lc
I. INTRODUCTION
The security of quantum cryptography is based on the
inherent uncertainty in quantum phenomena and it is the
only known means of providing unconditionally secure
communication [1, 2]. Almost all contemporary practical
QKD implementations are derived from the BB84 pro-
tocol [3], a QKD protocol first proposed in 1984 and
commercially implemented for limited market applica-
tions in the early 2000s. A major limitation of BB84
is that it requires no more than a single photon per time
slot. Practically one relies on optical beams so weak that
they generate less than one photon on average per time
slot. In fact, BB84 and its decoy-state derivative are
provably secure and optimal only when the mean photon
number is about 0.5 [4–10].
In this paper, we introduce a new multi-photon QKD
protocol, first proposed in [11], and demonstrate its
security against the intercept-resend (IR) attack, the
photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack, and the man-in-
the-middle (MIM) attack. It is found that the mean
photon number of the coherent pulses can generally be
greater than 1. The protocol thus has the potential to
allow QKD using detectors that may not be very effi-
cient. It should be noted that multi-photon QKD proto-
cols have also been studied under the category of continu-
ous variable (CV) QKD protocols [12–14]. Nevertheless,
CV-QKD requires homodyne or heterodyne detections,
which are generally more complicated than photon count-
ing used in discrete variable QKD protocols, as well as
more sensitive to the noise in the quantum channel.
The principle behind the multi-photon, multi-stage
QKD protocol to be discussed below is essentially the
same as that of the classical double-lock cryptography.
Security is given by the asymmetry in the detection
strategies between the legitimate users and the eaves-
dropper, which is provided by the advantage creation
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akin to that utilized in the optimal quantum receiver in
the Y00 (or αη) protocol [15] and the keyed communi-
cation in quantum noise (KCQ) method [16]. A main
difference is that the current protocol does not require a
pre-shared key as in Y00 or KCQ.
In the following, we provide a detailed analysis on the
security of the simplest form of the multi-stage protocol,
the three-stage protocol. The dependence of the error
probabilities in terms of the number of photons utilized
in the channel will be studied.
II. THREE-STAGE QUANTUM
CRYPTOGRAPHY
We now discuss the operations of the multi-photon tol-
erant quantum protocols in terms of transferring state X
from Alice to Bob. The state X is one of two orthogonal
states, designated as |0〉 and |1〉. The orthogonal states
of X represent 0 and 1 by prior mutual agreement of the
parties and they are the cryptographic key being trans-
mitted over the public channel. Alice and Bob apply
secret transformations UA and UB which are commuta-
tive, i.e., UAUB = UBUA, on the quantum state before
it is transmitted in the channel.
The steps of the protocol are described as follows:
1. Alice applies a unitary transformation UA on infor-
mation X and sends it to Bob.
2. Bob randomly chooses to retain the received signal
UA(X) for authentication or to send it back to Alice
with UB applied.
3. Alice randomly chooses to retain the received signal
UBUA(X) for authentication or to send it back to
Bob with U †A (complex conjugate transpose of UA)
applied.
4. Bob applies U †B on U
†
AUBUA(X) = UB(X) to get
the information X .
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FIG. 1: Schematic diagram of the three-stage protocol. The
data X is encrypted by the commutative transformations UA
and UB during the transmission in the quantum channel.
5. After receiving all the pulses, Bob announces pub-
licly which pulses he has measured. Alice then dis-
cards those pulses that Bob did not measure. If the
bit rate of the key is too low, the key is abandoned.
6. Bob tells Alice the qubits he chose for authentica-
tion. Alice reveals to him the corresponding trans-
formations and X she applied for those qubits. The
transformations are used to estimate the possibility
of a man-in-the-middle attack. The authentication
can likewise be performed using the pulses retained
by Alice. Then Alice reveals to Bob some portion
of the exchanged information X to check the error
rate. They accept the rest of the key if the error
rate of the key and the transformations are below
certain thresholds.
7. Alice and Bob finally perform post-processing (er-
ror correction and privacy amplification) as usual
to minimize Eve’s information.
The schematic of the three-stage protocol is shown in
Fig. 1. It should be noted that the unitaries UA and
UB can be some general transformations that can mask
the original state X . The parameters in UA and UB can
be from a discrete or a continuous set. In the following,
we consider the encoding of the qubit using the polariza-
tion of the photons in a coherent state. In this way, the
data X is represented by the polarization angle θX and
the unitary transformations UA and UB are realized as
polarization rotations through angles θA and θB respec-
tively. Note that since UA and UB are required to be
commutative, the polarization rotations are constrained
on a great circle of the Poincare´ sphere.
It is remarked that the use of many polarization angles
to increase the robustness of QKD protocols has also been
explored in [17, 18]. In addition, the scheme described
here can in principle be applied to other degrees of free-
dom of the photons just like the Y00 protocol [19, 20]
and the state X can be extended to multi-alphabet qu-
dit systems.
III. DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE
THREE-STAGE PROTOCOL
The three-stage protocol can be viewed as a quantum
double-lock encryption, with the unitary transformations
(polarization rotations in this case) UA and UB acting as
the locks. Therefore, the security of the three-stage pro-
tocol relies on (1) the ability of the transformations in
protecting the transmitted bit value, and (2) the premise
that Alice and Bob are certain that they are the ones who
really applied the locks during the information transmis-
sion. The man-in-the-middle (MIM) attack by an in-
truder Eve exploits the second condition. We shall treat
the two situations in detail in the following.
The main idea of the three-stage protocol is that, to
obtain the key X , Bob only needs to distinguish between
two possible orthogonal polarization states, e.g., horizon-
tal or vertical. On the other hand, in order to obtain use-
ful information, an eavesdropper Eve needs to determine
the arbitrary unknown polarization angles φi of the quan-
tum state transmitting in the quantum channel. The ac-
curacy of her measurement depends on the number of
photons she can access from the channel.
The amount of polarization rotations that both sides
(Alice and Bob) select to give to the information bits is
an arbitrary and independent value which varies from 0
to 180 degrees. It should be noted that practically one
must also take into account the difficulties with maintain-
ing stability and fidelity in the presence of noise. In the
following analysis, we will ignore such requirements and
assume that Alice and Bob can maintain perfect align-
ment in their basis for simplicity.
A. Intercept-Resend (IR) and Photon Number
Splitting (PNS) Attacks
We first consider the situation that the communication
between Alice and Bob is authenticated, i.e., Alice knows
that the information she sends out passes through Bob
in the intermediate step and vice versa. Under this as-
sumption, Eve can launch intercept-resend (IR) attacks,
or more importantly, the photon-number-splitting (PNS)
attack.
The main difference between IR and PNS is that, in IR
all the photons are being taken out by Eve and she then
resends any photon state to Bob. On the other hand,
under PNS attack, the number of photons Bob receives
is less than that in the original pulse. Such a loss of
photons practically could be due to the channel loss, but
in the analysis one has to attribute it to the action of the
intruder.
If we further restrict ourselves to the situation of inco-
herent attacks, Eve is required to perform measurements
before the classical postprocessing. Therefore, under the
IR attack, the polarization states of the pulses resent by
Eve usually are different from that she intercepts because
of the measurement process, with the difference depend-
3ing on the number of photons she receives. We can es-
timate the security against the IR attack by assuming
the polarization states of the resent pulses are the same
as those before the pulses are intercepted by Eve. This
is an overestimation of the ability of Eve. Nevertheless,
it enables us to analyze IR and PNS attacks using the
same formalism. In addition, Eve’s information IEA and
IEB become identical, where IEA = maxEve I(E : A) is
the maximal mutual information between Eve and Alice
with a similar expression for I(E : B).
For the IR and PNS attacks on the three-stage pro-
tocol, Eve only needs to measure the polarization angles
of any two stages (say the first and the second stages).
Then she can extract the bit value by orienting her mea-
surement device in the third stage according the angles
of the first and second stages.
More definitely, suppose the polarization angles of the
three stages of the protocol are denoted by φ1 = θX+θA,
φ2 = θX + θA + θB and φ3 = θx + θB, where θX is the
information bit angle (0 or pi/2), and θA and θB are the
angles associated with Alice’s and Bob’s unitary trans-
formations. Then the corresponding angles estimated by
Eve for the first two stages are written as φˆ1 = θˆX + θˆA
and φˆ2 = θˆX + θˆA + θˆB. As a result, θˆB = φˆ2 − φˆ1.
In order for Eve to obtain useful information, she re-
quires that the error in determining θB should not be
too large. Since θX is a binary random number of either
0 or pi/2, Eve will determine the bit value erroneously if∣∣∣θˆB − θB∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣(φˆ2 − φˆ1)− (φ2 − φ1)∣∣∣ > pi/4. The error
probability of Eve is then given by
Pe(N1, N2) =
∫
S
dφˆ1 dφˆ2 dφ1 dφ2 P (φ1)P1(φˆ1|φ1, N1)
×P (φ2)P2(φˆ2|φ2, N2), (1)
where P (φ) = 1/2pi is the prior distribution of Alice’s
(Bob’s) rotation angle and Pi(φˆi|φi, Ni) is the conditional
probability of determining φˆi given the angle φi and the
mean photon number Ni that is accessible by Eve. The
integration domain S corresponds to the region where
the condition
∣∣∣(φˆ2 − φˆ1)− (φ2 − φ1)∣∣∣ > pi/4 is satisfied.
The mutual information I(E : A) is given by I(E : A) =
1− h(Pe), where h(x) is the binary entropy function.
Consider a three-stage protocol using coherent states
of mean photon number N . First of all, Alice should
randomize the phases of the coherent states to avoid Eve
exploiting the phase information [21]. In this case, the
quantum state is described by a density matrix with pho-
ton number following the Poisson distribution with pa-
rameter N .
To obtain a bound of the secure key rate, one has to
estimate Eve’s maximal information (see Section III C be-
low). This involves an optimal measurement strategy to
obtain the conditional probability Pi(φˆi|φi, Ni). Bagan
et al. [22] gave a detailed comparison of the estimation
of the polarization state of a finite number of photons
using the collective and local measurements. Instead of
an optimal polarization measurement, in the following
we consider a simple strategy that Eve performs polar-
ization analysis with a fixed basis, denoted as horizontal
and vertical, that is the same as Alice’s and Bob’s ba-
sis. Such a fixed basis (or tomographic) measurement
is generally not optimal. Nevertheless, we additionally
assume that Eve can determine the polarization angle
correctly using a single basis only, instead of two bases
that are required for the polarization states on a circle of
the Poincare´ sphere. This is accomplished by attribut-
ing Eve’s measured polarization in the correct quadrant
as the original polarization in the numerical calculations
below. This procedure effectively doubles the number of
photons available to Eve for the estimation, and the fi-
delity obtained is generally even better than that using
optimal collective measurements (see Fig. 1 of [22]).
With the measurement strategy mentioned above, the
probability distributions of Eve’s numbers of horizontal
and vertical photons in the three stages are given by
Pi(nH,i, nV,i|φi, Ni)
=
e−Ni
1− e−Ni
(
Ni cos
2 φi
)2nH,i (
Ni sin
2 φi
)2nV,i
nH,i!nV,i!
, (2)
for i = 1, 2, 3, where Ni is the mean number of photons
in stage i that is accessible by Eve. Here the continuous
variable φˆi in Eq. (1) is replaced by the discrete variables
nH,i and nV,i. Then φi can be estimated from the num-
bers of photons detected in the vertical port (nV,i) and
the horizontal port (nH,i) of the polarization analyzer by
tan2 φˆi = nV,i/nH,i. Note that in Eq. (2), nH,i and nV,i
cannot be zero simultaneously, for this gives no informa-
tion to Eve about the angle φi. Also we assume Ni is
known to Eve.
For the PNS attack, Eve’s best strategy without caus-
ing errors to Bob’s received bits will be to take N1 =
N2 ≈ N/2 if Bob did not monitor the photon statistics.
Nevertheless, we require that Bob monitors the number
of incoming photons so that Eve cannot probe Alice and
his devices with very bright pulses. For the IR attack,
we can consider N1 = N2 ≈ N . This corresponds to the
optimal situation for Eve when the channel is assumed to
be lossless. For a lossy channel with transmittance t, we
consider N1 = N and N2 = tN for IR and N1 = (1− t)N
and N2 = (1 − t)tN for PNS. Figure 2 gives the plots
of Pe as a function of the mean photon number N . It
is seen in Fig. 2 that even at the mean photon number
N = 10, there is considerable error in Eve’s estimated
values of the true bit values.
As mentioned previously, Alice and Bob need to mon-
itor the number of incoming photons to avoid Eve from
injecting a very bright beam to probe their encoding de-
vices. The presence of Eve is revealed if Alice and Bob
also check the photon number distribution and detect any
loss or change of the distribution. Eve could compensate
the photon loss in the channel by injecting photons of
arbitrary polarizations or at the angles φˆi, as in the IR
attack. Nevertheless, this introduces extra error in her
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FIG. 2: Plots of (a) the IR and (b) the PNS error probabilities Pe(N1, N2) of Eve as functions of the mean number of photons
N (see the text for detail).
determination of θˆX as well as error in Bob’s bits. In
addition, the IR attack in fact induces errors to the bit
values obtained by Bob. The estimation of the rotation
angle error is addressed by the authentication process
which specifically handles the man-in-the-middle attack
in the next section.
B. Authentication
The three-stage protocol can be compromised entirely
if Eve launches the man-in-middle (MIM) attack as de-
picted in Fig. 3. Here Eve impersonates Bob to extract
the true bit value perfectly. She also impersonates Alice
to send the bit angle θX together with the unperturbed
θ
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FIG. 3: Schematic diagram of the three-stage protocol under
the man-in-the-middle (MIM) attack. Eve impersonates Alice
and Bob simultaneously. To Alice, Eve impersonates Bob
and operates the three-stage protocol by applying her own
rotation angle θˆB , which could be any angle or the one that
she derives from the photons coming from Bob, in the second
stage. Likewise she can apply the angle φˆ1 to the photons
sending to Bob in the first stage to minimize the chance of
Bob catching her.
angle θB back to Bob, so that Bob receives the bit with-
out error and hence cannot catch Eve. In such an MIM
attack, Eve totally separates the quantum communica-
tion between Alice and Bob. Therefore the attack could
be revealed if authentications are made by Alice and Bob
to guarantee the locks are legitimate, i.e., they are the
true users who applied the rotation angles on the pulses
they received in the three stages.
In principle, authentication can be performed perfectly
if Alice and Bob could retain the photons in steps 2
and 3 of the protocol above until the end of the key ex-
change, which can be accomplished by using quantum
memories [23, 24] or slow light technologies [25]. More
practically they need to perform measurements to deter-
mine the parameters of the transformations during the
key exchange. At the end of the key exchange, they
check their measured values against the true values (step
6). It should be noted that we assume Alice and Bob are
authenticated for exchanging classical information on a
public channel. This will rule out the chance that Eve is
also in the middle when Alice and Bob try to compare
the measurements.
We consider that the transmittance of the quantum
channel is t. If Alice sends pulses with a mean photon
number of N , Bob expects to receive pulses with mean
photon number tN in the first stage and t3N in the third
stage, and Alice expects to receive pulses with mean pho-
ton number t2N in the second stage. Therefore, for the
MIM attack, Eve can extract a mean photon number of
(1 − t2)N to obtain the estimate φˆ1 and a mean photon
number of t(1 − t2)N to obtain the estimate θˆB. Eve
then use these two angles to impersonate Alice and Bob
simultaneously. If Bob uses the pulse for authentication
instead of the normal three-stage, the angle φ˜1 he mea-
sures conditioned on φ1 will have a distribution given by
P1(φ˜1|φˆ1, tN)P1(φˆ1|φ1, (1− t
2)N). Here φ1 is announced
to Bob by Alice at the end of the protocol. Using this
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FIG. 4: Bob’s error probabilities in the estimation of θX for the normal three-stage operation (P
Auth, norm
e , blue lines) and
under the MIM attack (PAuth, MIMe , red lines) at different values of the channel transmittance t. The green lines denote the
differences between the two error probabilities.
angle, Bob can guess θX with an error probability of
PAuth, MIMe (t, N) =
∫
|φ1−φ˜1|>pi/4
dφ1 dφ˜1 dφ2 dφ˜2
P1(φ˜1|φˆ1, tN)P1(φˆ1|φ1, (1− t
2)N)P (φ1). (3)
On the other hand, in the normal operation when the
MIM attack is not present, Bob’s error probability is in-
stead given by
PAuth, norme (t, N)
=
∫
|φ1−φ˜1|>pi/4
dφ1 dφ˜1 P1(φ˜1|φ1, tN)P (φ1). (4)
It is remarked that Eqs. (3) and (4) manifest that fact
that, like Eve, Bob and Alice cannot estimate the polar-
ization angles with certainty in the middle of the three-
stage protocol because the photons are not in orthogonal
states.
Numerical simulations were performed using the mea-
surement scheme described in the last section. Figure 4
shows the two error probabilities as functions of the mean
photon number N for different values of the transmit-
tance t. In addition, PAuth, norme is found analytically to
be
PAuth, norme (t, N)
≈
2
pi (1− e−N)
[∫ pi/2
pi/4
∞∑
nH=1
P1(nH , 0|φ1, tN)dφ1
+
∫ pi/4
0
∞∑
nV =1
P1(0, nV |φ1, tN)dφ1
]
=
etN/2
[
I0
(
tN
2
)
− L0
(
tN
2
)]
− 1
etN − 1
, (5)
where In(x) is the modified Bessel function of the first
kind and Ln(x) is the modified Struve function.
It is noted in Fig. 4 that at small N the error probabil-
ities tend to the constant values PAuth, norme → 2
−1−pi−1
and PAuth, MIMe → 0.5 whereas both probabilities tend to
zero at large N . When the transmittance decreases, the
two error probabilities converge to each other at a smaller
N . In addition, the difference PAuth, MIMe − P
Auth, norm
e
approaches an asymptotic form when t → 0, which is
non-negligibly greater than zero for N < 4.
C. Secure Key Rate and Rate Efficiency
With error correction and privacy amplification, the
expression for the secret key rate extractable using one-
way classical postprocessing is [2]
K = R [I(A : B)−min (IEA, IEB)] , (6)
6where R is the raw key rate, I(A : B) is the mutual
information between Alice and Bob, and IEA and IEB
are Eve’s information about the raw key of Alice and
Bob respectively. We consider the case when H(A) =
H(B) = 1 and H(A|B) = H(B|A) = h(Q), where h(Q)
is the binary entropy function and Q is the quantum
bit error rate (QBER). For the three-stage protocol, the
raw key rate is given by the total bit that Bob measured
minus the bits for authentication.
Assuming the error correction is carried out perfectly
and using a very conservative estimate for the PNS/IR
attack mentioned in Section IIIA with mutual informa-
tion I(E : A) = 1 − h (Pe(N, tN)), the security key rate
then becomes
K = R [(1− f)h (Pe(N, tN))− h(Q)] , (7)
where f is the fraction of the MIM attacks launched by
Eve, which is estimated by the ratio of the measured au-
thentication error probability difference and the expected
measured authentication error probability difference, i.e.,
f =
PAuth, measurede (t, N)− P
Auth, norm
e (tN)
PAuth, MIMe (t, N)− P
Auth, norm
e (tN)
. (8)
The threshold for the QBER is then determined by the
condition K > 0 for some given f < 1 and N .
A potentially significant drawback of the three-stage
protocol compared to other QKD protocols is that it re-
quires multiple quantum communications between Alice
and Bob, effectively increases the photon loss of the chan-
nel. On the other hand, the multiple-photon resilient na-
ture of the protocol allows a larger mean photon number
to start with. As an estimate, we consider the ratio of
the raw bit rates between the three stage protocol and
the weak-coherent state BB84 with mean photon number
0.5. The ratio is given by
E =
1− eNt(2l)
1− e−0.5t(l)
, (9)
where the transmittance t is given as a function of dis-
tance by t(l) = 10−αl/10. For optical fiber at the wave-
length 1550 nm, α = 0.2 dB/km. The three-stage proto-
col will have advantage over a one-stage protocol if E > 1.
This gives
l ≤
(
5
α
log10
N
0.5
)
km. (10)
It is emphasized that the choice of N depends on the
security level described in the previous sections. From
the previous analysis, it is seen that the MIM attack puts
a more stringent condition to N than the PNS/IR attack.
It is estimated that for up to a distance of 20 km with
N = 3, the three-stage protocol could be advantageous
over the decoy state BB84.
D. Amplification Attack
So far we have only focused on the situation where Eve
makes direct measurement using the photons that she
siphons off from the quantum channel. Generally she can
do more with her photons. An important class of attacks
is by amplifying the quantum states that she extracts
from the channel. This kind of attack is linked to the
foundation of the three-stage protocol, that is whether
she can find out the angles θA and θB, which are open
to her eavesdropping, with high precision. In fact, the
purpose of using finite number of photons in the channel
is to limit Eve’s precision of measurement.
It is well known that the amplification of a quantum
state must also accompany with the amplification of the
noise [26]. For the implementation with coherent states
discussed in this paper, Eve does not gain anything by
amplifying the signal. Even with the use of squeezed
states, Fock states or entangled states to resend pulses
to Bob and Alice, the intensity check by Alice and Bob
will introduce vacuum noise to Eve’s probes, and Eve’s
information gain may only be modest.
On the other hand, it is recently shown that noiseless
amplification of a quantum state is possible if a perfect
guarantee of success is not required, unlike the usual de-
terministic linear amplification mentioned above [27, 28].
Experiments of amplifying coherent states noiselessly
have already been demonstrated [29, 30]. This appar-
ently imposes a significant drawback to the three-stage
protocol. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the prob-
abilistic nature of the amplification means that Eve’s bit
rate will further decrease. More importantly, the imple-
mentations of the amplification of coherent states operate
with high fidelity only when the mean photon number af-
ter the gain is around unity [29, 30]. The amplification
attack works well essentially for very weak coherent states
but not for the regime of N > 1 that we consider in our
protocol. The distortion of the quantum states at larger
N introduces noise to the determination of the polariza-
tion. Further work is needed to quantify the effects of
the amplification attack to the security of the protocol.
Another issue related to the amplification attack on
the three-stage protocol is that, in the actual implemen-
tation, the polarization rotations θA and θB nevertheless
have to be confined to a finite set because of the noise and
stability of the experimental setup. Such limitation may
open up the unambiguous state discrimination (USD) at-
tack [31, 32]. Fortunately, the polarization rotations are
local information that is secret to Alice and Bob inde-
pendently; they can change their sets of the rotations
frequently without disclosing their actions. This results
in an extremely large set of the polarization rotations
and effectively mitigates the threat of the USD attack,
which requires that the number of photons needed must
be greater than or equal to the number of polarization
states in the middle of the three-stage protocol.
7IV. CONCLUSION
This paper gave a detailed security analysis to a new
form of quantum key distribution protocol, the three-
stage multi-photon quantum cryptography system, us-
ing coherent states to encode qubits. In particular, we
showed that the three-stage protocol is resilient to the
photon number splitting attack, the intercept-resend at-
tack, and the man-in-the-middle attack with the error
probabilities calculated as functions of the mean num-
ber of photons in the channel. We have obtained the
secure key rate in terms of the error probabilities under
the attacks considered. Importantly, we found that the
mean photon number of the coherent states can practi-
cally be larger than 1, in contrast to most current QKD
protocols in which weak coherent pulses (mean photon
number ∼ 0.1 for BB84 to 0.6 for decoy-BB84) are con-
sidered. The multi-photon multi-stage scheme presented
does not require pre-sharing of a key between the legiti-
mate users like the Y00 protocol. Hence it can be used to
complement such multi-photon quantum communication
protocols.
We have also discussed the amplification and unam-
biguous state discrimination attacks and argued that
such attacks do not impose significant threat to our pro-
tocol. Further study on this issue will be pursued in
future to quantify the actual effect of the amplification
attack using the analytic tool for the optimal coherent
state amplifier [33].
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